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I. INTRODUCTION TO ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH V.
ARIZONA
In 1988, Arizonans approved by a one-percent margin a
state constitutional amendment prohibiting the state govern-
ment's use of languages other than English.' The amendment
was the result of a petition drive initiated by the organization,
"Arizonans for Official English."2 The amendment became Arti-
cle XXVIII (Article 28) of the Arizona Constitution and was enti-
tled "English as the Official Language." 3 Article 28 provides that
1. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
banc), cert. granted, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), va-
cated as moot and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). The amendment drew affirmative
votes of 50.5% of Arizonan citizens casting ballots in the election. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at
924. The amendment passed by a margin of 580,830 to 569,993. Note, Constitutional
Law--irst Amendment-Ninth Circuit Invalidates Arizona Constitution's Official Eng-
lish Requirement, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1827 (1996).
2. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924.
3. Id. Article 28, Section I Arizona Constitution:
1. English as the Official Language: Applicability
Section 1.
(1) The English language is the official language of the State of Arizona.
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the
language of the ballot, the public schools and all government functions
and actions.
(3)(a) This Article applies to:
(i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government,
(ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, organizations, and in-
strumentalities of this State, including local governments and munici-
palities,
(iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and policies,
(iv) all government officials and employees during the performance of gov-
ernment business.
(b) As used in this Article, the phrase "This State and all political subdivi-
sions of this State" shall include every entity, person, action or item de-
scribed in this Section, as appropriate to the circumstances.
2. Requiring This State to Preserve, Protect and Enhance English.
Section 2. This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall take all
reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English
language as the official language of the State of Arizona.
3. Prohibiting This State from Using or Requiring the Use of Languages
Other Than English; Exceptions
Section 3.
350
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English is the official language of the State of Arizona and that
the "State and all [of its] political subdivisions" 4 including "all
government officials and employees during the performance of
government business 5 ... shall act in English and in no other
language."6  Under the new amendment, English "is the lan-
guage of the ballot, the public schools and all government func-
tions and actions."7 Although twenty-two states have adopted
English-Only laws,8 Arizona's Article 28 is "by far the most re-
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2):
(a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English
and in no other language.
(b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce a law, order,
decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English.
(c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or enforceable unless
it is in the English language.
(2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a lan-
guage other than English under any of the following circumstances:
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the
extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational in-
struction in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible
a transition to English.
(b) to comply with other federal laws.
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as part of a required or voluntary
educational curriculum.
(d) to protect public health or safety.
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crimes.
4. Enforcement; Standing
Section 4. A person who resides in or does business in this State shall have
standing to bring suit to enforce this Article in a court of record of the
State. The Legislature may enact reasonable limitations on the time and
manner of bringing suit under this subsection.
RAYMOND TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN.: THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE
MOVEMENT AND THE AMERICAN STATES 263-65 (1995) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§
1-4).
4. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2.
5. Id. art. XXVIII, § 1(3)(a)(iv).
6. Id. art. XXVIII, § 3(1)(a).
7. Id. art. XXVIII, § 1(2).
8. Cecilia Wong, Language Is Speech. The Illegitimacy of Official English After
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 278 n.6 (1996).
Besides Arizona, the states that have adopted such provisions are: Alabama, ALA.
CONST. amend. 509; Arkansas, ARmt CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie 1995); California, CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 6; Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; Florida, FLA. CONST. art. II, §
9; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (Supp. 1996); Hawaii, HAw. CONST. art. XV, § 4;
Illinois, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 460/20 (West 1993); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-
1 (West 1996); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Michie 1992); Mississippi, MSS.
CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1991); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510 (1995); Nebraska, NEB.
CONST. art. 1, § 27; New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-C:1 (Supp. 1995); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14512 (1995); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13
(1989); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); South Da-
kota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-27-20 (Michie Supp. 1996); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §
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strictively worded official-English law to date."9
In 1988, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Article 28 in the federal district
court, when Maria-Kelly Yniguez, a Hispanic and bilingual em-
ployee of the Arizona Department of Administration, filed an ac-
tion against the State of Arizona, the Governor of the State of
Arizona, the Attorney General of the State of Arizona, and the
Director of the Arizona Department of Administration. 10
Yniguez, who handled medical malpractice claims for the State,
claimed she ceased speaking Spanish on the job for fear of dis-
cipline under the amendment and filed an action seeking an in-
junction against enforcement of Article 28 as well as a declara-
tion that Article 28 violated her First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.1 ' Yniguez's complaint was subsequently
amended to include a Hispanic state senator from Arizona as a
plaintiff.12 However, the district court later ruled that the sena-
tor's claims were barred as to all of the defendants.'3 The court
also barred Yniguez's claims against the Attorney General of the
State and the Director of the Arizona Department of Admini-
stration, but maintained her claim against the Governor of Ari-
zona.14 The district court found that only the Governor had the
4-1404 (1991); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); and
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1996).
9. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 927 (citing Note, English Only Laws and Direct Legislation:
The Battle in the States Over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 337 (1991)).
10. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925.
11. Id. at 924. Prior to the passage of the amendment, and because Yniguez was
fluent in both English and Spanish, Yniguez often communicated with her non-English-
speaking claimants and her bilingual claimants in Spanish. Id. It is important to note
that the language restriction imposed by Article 28 will send a message deterring lan-
guages other than Spanish from being spoken in public offices including sign language
and the indigenous languages of Apache, Hopi, Hualapai, Navajo, O'odham, Yaqui, and
Havasupai-all of which are spoken by certain percentages of Arizonans. Brief of Amici
Curiae Linguistic Society of America and National Council for Languages and Interna-
tional Studies in Support of Respondents at 1-4, Yniguez (No. 95-974), available in 1996
WL 413764.
12. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925 (citing Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz.
1990)). The Hispanic state senator, Jaime Gutierrez, claimed he feared being sued under
Article 28 if he continued speaking Spanish when communicating with his Spanish-
speaking constituents. Id. The senator was concerned about the impact Article 28 would
have on the speech rights of the Hispanic population of Arizona. Id.
13. Id. The court found that none of the defendants had enforcement power against
the senator sufficient to satisfy the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(under this doctrine, a federal court can grant relief by compelling state officials to com-
ply with federal law), because state executive branch officials do not have the authority
to prosecute members of the legislative branch. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925.
14. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925. The district court found that because the Attorney
[Vol. 29:1-2
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authority to enforce Article 28 against Yniguez and had suffi-
ciently threatened to do so.15 Reaching the merits of Yniguez's
claim, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona ruled
that Article 28 was facially broad in violation of the First
Amendment. 16 In granting declaratory relief, the district court
denied injunctive relief in favor of Yniguez because no enforce-
ment action was pending, and thus the court did not reach the
other constitutional issue that Yniguez asserted. 17
In 1992, "Arizonans for Official English," the principal spon-
sor of the ballot initiative codified as Article 28, filed a notice of
appeal in the district court.'8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, affirmed, reasserting that
Article 28 violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment.' 9 Again, the court made no reference to a Fourteenth
Amendment analysis of Article 28 or English-Only laws in gen-
eral.20 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the matter
General had no specific authority to enforce Article 28 against the plaintiff, Yniguez was
barred under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), from filing an action against him.
Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925. Similarly, the district court found that although the Director of
the Arizona Department of Administration had authority to exercise Article 28 against
Yniguez, the director had not threatened to do so; because of this, the director was dis-
missed as a defendant as well. Id.
15. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925. The court relied on the fact that "Mofford [the Arizona
State Governor] has officially stated that she intends to comply with Article XXVIII and
expects state service employees, of which Yniguez is one, to comply with Article XXVIII."
Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D. Ariz. 1990).
16. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925.
17. Id. at 925-26. Specifically, the court focused on and resolved the case on the
First Amendment issue, but failed to rule on the constitutionality of the law under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 926.
18. 69 F.3d at 926. It is important to note that, by the time the notice of appeal was
filed, Yniguez had resigned from her job as an insurance claimant and was no longer
working in the public sector. Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057. The Ninth Circuit, however,
did not find that Yniguez's resignation rendered the case moot, because a plea for nomi-
nal damages could be read into the plaintiffs "all other relief' clause to save the case. Id.
19. 69 F.3d at 947. Judge Reinhardt expressed his dissatisfaction with the seem-
ingly unlimited scope of Article 28 and stated:
This broad language means that Article XXVIII on its face applies to speech
in a seemingly limitless variety of governmental settings, from ministerial
statements by civil servants at the office to teachers speaking in the class-
room, from town-hall discussions between constituents and their representa-
tives to the translation of judicial proceedings in the courtroom. Under the
article, the Arizona state universities would be barred from issuing diplomas
in Latin, and judges performing weddings would be prohibited from saying
"Mazel Toy" as part of the official marriage ceremony.
Id. at 932.
20. 1d. at 947. Further, in rendering its decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to cer-
tify the matter of Article 28's interpretation and constitutionality to the State Supreme
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1-2
on March 25, 1996,21 and was expected to render a decision on
the constitutionality of Article 28 by the summer of 1997.22
However, the Court never made a decision based on either the
First or Fourteenth Amendment. 23 The highly politicized nature
of English-Only laws as an immigration and economic issue and
the fact that Yniguez's particular circumstances raised standing
and mootness issues afforded the Court an opportunity to dis-
miss the case based on Article III and to turn a deaf ear to the
constitutional questions raised. 24 In the end, the Supreme Court
Court. Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057. Moreover, although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
a state court challenge to Article 28's constitutionality, Ruiz v. Symington, No. 1 CA-CV
94-0235, 1996 WL 309512, at *1 (Ariz. App. Aug. 1, 1996), it found that litigation to be no
cause to stay the federal proceedings. Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057.
21. 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996). The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief and argue
two issues in addition to the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues raised below. The
first issue was whether the private group appealing had standing to maintain the action
since the State of Arizona had not appealed the Ninth Circuit decision. The second issue
was whether there was a case or controversy with respect to Maria-Kelly Yniguez, the
respondent in the case. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in English Only Cases, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, March 27, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 3-27-96 WLN 2647.
22. Despite Looming U.S. Supreme Court Decision, Sharply Divided House Passes
English-Only Bill, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 7, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 8-7-96
WLN 8157.
23. Finding the case moot, the court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and re-
manded the case with directions that the district court dismiss the action; in doing so,
the Court refused to interpret Article 28 or come to a decision as to its constitutionality.
Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057-58. The Court's ruling came as no surprise to many skeptical
authorities who predicted that the U.S. Supreme Court would avoid deciding the case on
its merits. Robert Marquand & Miriam Davidson, Court Lends Ear On 'English Only'
Case May Shape How States Conduct Business, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1996, at
1; English-Only Case Unravels in Supreme Court Hearing: Justices Sidestep Issue to Fo-
cus on Procedure, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 5, 1996, at 16A, Steve Lash, First Amendment
English-Only Case Becomes High Court Debate on Standing, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 5,
1996, available in WESTLAW, 12-5-96 WLN 12997; David G. Savage, High Court's
'English-Only' Case Boils Down to Legalese, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A30; Jan Craw-
ford, Justices Back Away From Language Case: Appeal of 'English-Only' Law May Not
Belong Before Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1996, at 10; Aaron Epstein, Procedural
Snags Impair Debate of English-Only Laws, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 1996, at 8A-
Technicalities Keep Court From Ruling on English Law, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Dec. 5, 1996,
at 1A; Roger K Lowe, Top-Court Case May Be Lost in Legalese, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Dec. 5, 1996, at 3A.
24. Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057-58. This result could have been easily predicted
from the initial arguments in the case on December 4, 1996. United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript, 1996 WL 711210, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116
S. Ct. 1316 (1996) (No. 95-974). There, the United States Supreme Court focused on
standing and mootness issues and made little mention of the First and Fourteenth
Amendment issues. Id. In rendering its decision a few months later, the Court found
that Yniguez no longer satisfied the case or controversy requirement; the Court found
that the plaintiffs resignation from the public sector to work in the private sector mooted
her case since her speech in the private sector was no longer governed by Article 28.
Yniguez, 117 S. Ct. at 1057-58. The Court noted that an actual controversy must be ex-
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again sidestepped the question of the constitutionality of Eng-
lish-Only laws.
Nevertheless, while technically presenting only a First
Amendment claim, Yniguez raises broader issues regarding
prejudice against non-English speakers and discrimination based
upon national origin and race that are bound to be raised
again.25 Although the courts have chosen to focus on the First
Amendment constitutional issue in rendering their decisions,
26
this Case Note will examine the arguments for and against Eng-
lish-Only legislation in the context of an equal protection analy-
sis.
This Case Note will analyze Arizona Constitution Article 28,
under the standards associated with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Case Note will argue that
English-Only laws are not narrowly tailored to satisfy the prof-
fered state interests as required under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's strict judicial review standard. A parallel distinction will
be made with regard to national origin and race discrimination
and Article 28. In doing so, the state's interest in encouraging
linguistic unity and curtailing public cost will be set against the
non-English speakers' interest in protecting their cultural heri-
tage and in keeping access to the government open to all persons
regardless of their particular language fluency. Part II of the
Case Note will put the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause into perspective, focusing on two lines of cases that
illuminate the clause. Part III of the Case Note will analyze Ar-
ticle 28 under the strict scrutiny standard involving national
origin and race discrimination discussed in Part II. Part IV con-
cludes that English-Only laws, generally, and Article 28, specifi-
cally, violate the Equal Protection Clause because there is no
close fit between the state's objective and its legislation and be-
cause education is a less restrictive alternative to English-Only
laws.
tant at all stages of review, and not just when the complaint is filed in order for a case to
qualify for federal court adjudication. Id. at 1057-58.
25. Martina Stewart, Note, English-Only Laws, Informational Interests, and the
Meaning of the First Amendment in a Pluralistic Society, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539,
539 (1996).
26. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 947.
355
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II. HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
ENGLISH-ONLY LAWS PERPETUATE DISCRIMINATION OF A
SUSPECT CLASS IDENTIFIED BY LANGUAGE AND SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO STRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW
Although the constitutions of many nations contain official-
language provisions, 27 the U.S. Constitution contains no such
provision. 28 In fact, since the nation's inception and during most
of its early history, repeated efforts to establish a monolingual
New World were consistently defeated. 29 The colonies were, in
essence, multilingual territories, and German, French, and hun-
dreds of American Indian and other languages were widely spo-
ken.30 This multilingual community, however, did not last long.
The increased and prolonged immigration from Southern and
Eastern Europe during the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century created a backlash of
anti-immigrant sentiment that manifested itself in the laws of
this country.31 Although this backlash lessened with the passing
27. Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 296 (1989).
28. See U.S. CONST. This is true despite the fact that two out of three Americans
erroneously believe that English is the official language of the United States. Califa, su-
pra note 27, at 293.
29. Califa, supra note 27, at 296. For example, early colonists defeated an attempt
to create a language academy that would have set standards for proper English and, in
essence, would have established English as the primary language. Id.
30. Id. In fact, German was widely spoken throughout the nation. Id. At the time,
Pennsylvania was one of several states that published its laws in both English and Ger-
man. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cul-
tural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 305 (1992). The increased
use of German among the colonies led the Commissioner of Education to note that Ger-
man had "actually become the second language of our Republic, and a knowledge of Ger-
man is now considered essential to a finished education." Califa, supra note 27, at 297.
Moreover, the Continental Congress translated many official publications into German
and French to communicate with the non-English-speaking colonial residents. Brief of
Amici Curiae United States Representative Nydia M. Velasquez, Congressional Hispanic
Caucus, Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, National Association of Latino
Elected and Appointed Officials, and 32 Individual Members of the United States Con-
gress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22, Yniguez (No. 95-974), available in
1996 WL 418711. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress even used
German to persuade colonial German speakers to fight against Britain. Id. at 23. The
Continental Congress also published the Articles of Confederation in both German and
French; the Articles were translated to French in an attempt to encourage Quebec to join
the new nation. Id.
31. Califa, supra note 27, at 297. At the time, under the guise of"Americanization,"
new laws were passed throughout the country requiring English proficiency for employ-
ment, voting, and education. Id. Moreover, in 1906, federal law imposed the require-
ment that aliens speak English in order to become naturalized citizens; the rationale was
356
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of the decades, recent and steady increases in immigration, es-
pecially from Asian and Latin-American countries, have resur-
rected ideology implicating racism and nativism32 thought dealt
with long ago.13 Xenophobia of the magnitude experienced many
decades ago has reappeared today and movements demanding
national monolingualism have gained strength.
4
Generally, the courts have dealt with this xenophobia con-
cerning federal language rights through two lines of precedent.
3 5
The first line of precedent establishes the principle that lan-
guage discrimination can be a proxy for national origin discrimi-
nation. 36 In these cases, the Supreme Court upheld the right of
individuals to use foreign languages in spite of restrictions im-
posed by earlier statutes similar to Article 28.37 These cases
applied the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to
the issue of language rights and struck down laws prohibiting
the use of languages other than English in certain situations.
38
One such case, Meyer v. Nebraska,39 concluded that a statute
that prohibited the teaching of any subject to any grade below
the eighth grade in any language other than English violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.40 In rendering its decision, the U.S.
that such a requirement would improve the "quality" of naturalized citizens. Perea, su-
pra note 30, at 337. The Commission on Naturalization of 1905 expressed the popular
view: "[T]he proposition is incontrovertible that no man is a desirable citizen of the
United States who does not know the English language." Id.
32. "Nativism" has been defined as an historical development that embodies xeno-
phobia and a sense of the superiority of the Anglo-American over all other racial and
ethnic groups. TATALOVICH, supra note 3, at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id. It is important to note that when the organization U.S. English was estab-
lished in 1983, only a small cadre of activists promoted English-Only legislation at the
state level; today, U.S. English is a grassroots movement with a reported membership of
450,000 promoting English-Only laws in state and federal legislatures. Id. at 10-16.
35. Stewart, supra note 25, at 545.
36. Perea, supra note 30, at 357.
37. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law that pro-
hibited the teaching of any language other than English to a child who had not yet fin-
ished the eighth grade because the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the teaching of any
language other than English to a child who had not yet finished the eighth grade because
the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926) (invalidating a law that prohibited Chinese mer-
chant immigrants from keeping their financial books in Chinese and denied equal pro-
tection under the law).
38. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390; Bartels, 262 U.S. at 404; Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at
500.
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Id. at 399-403.
357
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Supreme Court alluded to the constitutional protection that the
Fourteenth Amendment affords all persons, English and non-
English speakers alike:
The protection of the Constitution extends to all; to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on
the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all
had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this can-
not be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitu-
tion-a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means.41
The cases in the first line of precedent were, in effect, early
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that concluded prohibitions on the
use or teaching of non-English languages constituted depriva-
tions of liberty under the substantive due process doctrine ac-
cepted at the time.42 Yet, despite being based on the substantive
due process doctrine of the 1920s, these cases have continuing
validity. 43 In fact, in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court cited these
cases to support the proposition that language can be a proxy for
race for purposes of an equal protection analysis. 44
The second, more recent, line of cases have denied non-
English speakers the right to state services in their native lan-
guages.4 These cases established the principle that "language,
by itself, does not identify members of a suspect class" for pur-
poses of an equal protection analysis.46 The focal point of the
courts' conclusions in these cases was that the state would suffer
significant economic burdens if it were saddled with the re-
quirement of providing government services in languages other
than English.47 Yet, despite this second line of cases, the courts
41. Id. at 401.
42. Perea, supra note 30, at 356 n.474 (citing Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 528; Meyer,
262 U.S. at 403).
43. Id. at 358.
44. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 352-79 (1991).
45. Stewart, supra note 25, at 546.
46. Id. at 546 & n.67 (citing Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1985)
(court found the plaintiff had no right to social security services or forms in Spanish);
Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975) (court found the plaintiff had
no right to civil service exam in Spanish)).
47. Stewart, supra note 25, at 546. It is important to note that although two lines
of precedent focused on the Fourteenth Amendment and federal language rights, see su-
pra Part II, the overall effect of the statutes/holdings involved in both lines of precedent
do not equate with the overall effect of Article 28. As stated in the text, there is a second
[Vol. 29:1-2358
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have recognized that language discrimination can be a proxy for
national origin discrimination for purposes of an equal protection
analysis. 48
In Hernandez v. New York, 49 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the plurality, stated in dicta that language discrimination and
race/national-origin discrimination can be one and the same.50
Establishing the link between language, race, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy wrote: "It may well be, for
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency
in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis."51 In in-
terpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court
found that discrimination on the basis of language can be forbid-
den as a type of discrimination based on national origin.
5 2
Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
regulations also acknowledged the nexus between language and
national origin discrimination, prohibiting discrimination
against a person simply because he/she possesses the "physical,
cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
line of precedent developed in the latter half of the century that effectively states that
courts cannot use language to identify suspect classes. See supra Part II. This line of
cases involves affirmative rights. Stewart, supra note 25, at 548. Further, this line of
cases is not applicable in a Fourteenth Amendment analysis of Article 28 and most Eng-
lish-Only laws. Article 28 questioned the use of a negative right. Yniguez was not seek-
ing that the government hire Spanish-speaking employees to deal with non-English-
speaking claimants; on the contrary, the plaintiff was only seeking that the government
allow the public employees, already hired, to make use of the skills and talents they al-
ready possessed (i.e. second-language skills) without the fear of reprimand. Yniguez, 69
F.3d at 924. As a result, Yniguez, much like the plaintiffs in the cases in the first line of
precedent, was seeking enforcement of a negative right. The fight for a negative right is
to be distinguished from a fight for an affirmative right as in the second line of prece-
dent. Stewart, supra note 25, at 548. In those cases, the plaintiffs sought the affirmative
right of having the government hire Spanish-speaking employees or of providing forms in
languages other than English. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir.
1985); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975). Satisfying the af-
firmative rights in these cases, unlike satisfying the negative rights in Yniguez, would
have imposed substantial burdens on the state since the government would have had to
proactively seek or apply non-English-speaking employees or non-English forms.
Stewart, supra note 25, at 546. Thus, since Yniguez concerns itself with negative rights
and the second line of precedent involves affirmative rights, the second line of cases is
not applicable to and is distinguishable from statutes such as Article 28 and cases such
as Yniguez.
48. Peres, supra note 30, at 357.
49. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
50. Id. at 371-72.
51. Id.
52. Perea, supra note 30, at 358.
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group."53 Moreover, statistics have demonstrated the connection
between language and national origin as well as the fact that
language can be a proxy for national origin.54 A 1984 study
found that ninety-seven percent of Spanish speakers are of His-
panic origin; similarly, about seventy-seven percent of American
Hispanics speak Spanish.55 Professor Juan F. Perea interprets
these statistics to show "how close a fit language discrimination
can be for discrimination because of national origin."5 6 Hence,
drawing in large part from the substantive due process analysis
of the cases in the first line of precedent as well as from modern
day court interpretations, agency regulations, and statistics,
modern law has come to acknowledge that certain classifications
based on language or language ability, such as English-Only
laws, may violate the Equal Protection Clause.
5 7
It is well established that state action based on race or na-
tional origin violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause 58 and is subject to strict scrutiny. 59 Therefore, as
a logical result from the conclusion that language discrimination
can equal national origin discrimination, legal commentators
contend that English-Only laws like Article 28 should be sub-
jected to a heightened form of scrutiny as an invidious classifi-
cation based on national origin.60 These legal commentators
conclude that English-Only laws use language as a proxy for un-
popular national origin and, as a result, should be subjected to
more intense scrutiny than that provided by the rational basis
test.61 Such an analysis of English-Only laws is based on the
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 359-60.
57. Id. at 356.
58. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
59. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
60. Perea, supra note 30, at 356-57. Perea states that "[clourts should subject dis-
criminatory state action based on language, because of its inextricable relationship to
ethnicity and national origin, to heightened scrutiny and should find it unconstitutional."
Id. at 360.
61. Id. at 357. These legal commentators are calling for standards of review that
would impose upon the state a higher burden than showing that the proposed law is ra-
tionally related to some state interest. Id. At this point, it is probably best to note that a
challenged government action is subject to one of three levels of scrutiny: 1) "Strict scru-
tiny" is the highest level of scrutiny and applies if the action intentionally discriminates
against a "suspect' class (i.e. national origin) or infringes a fundamental right. Under
such a test, the government's burden is practically insurmountable; state action must be
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and there must be no less restric-
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contention that statutes calling for governmental monolingual-
ism are based on unconstitutional motivations such as nativism,
and lead to the creation of a second-class citizenship for all
Americans whose primary language is not English.62 Although
such an analysis is novel in that the courts have never analyzed
language discrimination by use of an English-Only law in con-
junction with a strict scrutiny standard of review, many consider
it to be long overdue. 63
III. ANALYSIS OF ENGLISH-ONLY LAwS UNDER
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION STANDARD:
ENGLISH-ONLY LAWS ARE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED
TO SATISFY A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Analyzing Article 28 under strict scrutiny judicial review,
the state action must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a com-
pelling state interest, and there must be no less restrictive clas-
sification that would achieve the purpose. 64 Proponents of Eng-
lish-Only laws contend that Article 28 satisfies four compelling
state interests: 1. English-Only laws will encourage Hispanics
and other non-English-speaking minorities to learn English; 2.
English-Only laws are narrowly tailored to the state interest of
government efficiency; 3. English should be declared the official
language before Spanish is declared official; and 4. Absent a
declaration of English as the official language of the nation, the
United States will suffer linguistic discord and separatism as
has plagued other bilingual countries. 6 Arguably, the four state
interests are not satisfied by the legislation proffered in Article
28. The proposed means are not narrowly tailored to compelling
state objectives, but rather are juxtaposed to those interests.
tive classification that would achieve the purpose; 2) "Heightened scrutiny" is the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny and applies if the action intentionally discriminates on the basis
of gender, alienage, or illegitimacy. Under this test, the government must show a sub-
stantial relation between the state action and an important governmental interest; and
3) The "rational-basis test" is the lowest level of scrutiny and is the test for social and
economic regulation involving no suspect or quasi-suspect classes nor any fundamental
rights. Under this test, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595-610 (5th ed. 1995).
62. Perea, supra note 30, at 357.
63. Id. at 350-71; See generally Califa, supra note 27.
64. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 61, at 595-610.
65. Califa, supra note 27, at 312. Christopher Swope, Panel Oks Bill to Make Eng-
lish Official Government Language, 54 CONG. Q. 2128 (1996).
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Moreover, increased English-language education, as opposed to
English-Only legislation, will be a less restrictive classification.
This less restrictive classification would achieve the same objec-
tives without the imposition of a state constitutional amendment
that discriminates by using language as a proxy for disfavored
national origin and in the process violates the Equal Protection
Clause.66
A. English-Only Laws will not Serve the State
Interest of Encouraging Hispanics and Other
Non-English-Speaking Minorities to Learn
English
Proponents of English-Only laws believe that recent immi-
grants are not learning English.67 They cite the fact that the
majority of immigrants speak only Spanish and herald that re-
cent immigrants are unwilling or unable to learn English.68 As a
result, English-Only legislation is seen as a panacea to "force"
non-English-speaking immigrants to learn English. 69 The pro-
tected government interest is the encouragement of monolingual
unity. However, recent statistics and studies undermine the
reasoning behind these objectives.
A recent study showed that Hispanics and most other non-
English-speaking minorities conform to the classic three-
generation model of language acquisition.70 According to the
model, the first generation is mainly monolingual in Spanish or
other foreign language.71 The second generation is bilingual and
has a working understanding of both English and a for-
eign/second language. 72 The third generation prefers English
66. It is important to note that, for purposes of this analysis, the assumption that
the interests proffered by English-Only law supporters are indeed compelling has been
accepted as true. This point is highly arguable. Nevertheless, this Case Note rests on
the argument that, even if the stated objectives are compelling, the discriminatory effect
resulting from the implementation of English-Only laws as a means to achieve those ob-
jectives far outweighs any benefit. This shows that the means (English-Only laws) are
not narrowly tailored to the ends (proffered and alleged compelling interests). Therefore,
such laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
67. Califa, supra note 27, at 312-13.
68. Id. at 313-14.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 314-15.
71. Id. at 314.
72. Id.
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over the language of the home country. 73 This study has led to
the conclusion that the language shift from Spanish, or any other
foreign language, to English spans two to three generations, and
that a two-generation model is more likely in the future. 74 Ac-
cording to such models, without continued immigration, Spanish
and other foreign languages would not survive in the United
States, given a majority of immigrants' pace of learning Eng-
lish.7 5 Thus, any fears that non-English-speaking immigrants
are reluctant or incapable of learning English are unfounded.
Non-English-speaking immigrants are learning English without
any legal coercion. Non-English-speaking immigrants are aware
of the social and economic importance of learning to speak Eng-
lish, and are in fact doing so. 76 The demand to learn English is
so great that non-English speakers are on waiting lists to enter
English study classes.
77
In light of these findings, the alleged compelling state inter-
est of encouraging non-English speakers to learn English will be
better satisfied by increasing the number of English study
classes available to immigrants instead of encouraging English-
Only legislation. Increased education not only is less restrictive
but also should prove more beneficial to the proffered state ob-
jective. English-language education, instead of English-Only
legislation, will bypass the invidious discrimination inherent in
using language as a proxy for national origin and, at the same
time, will serve the attempted objective of reaching national lin-
guistic unity. Viewed in this light, English-Only legislation is
not narrowly tailored to the proposed government objective; the
remedy offered by English-Only legislation (i.e. discrimination
against non-English speakers) is broader than the scope of the
violation (i.e. multilingual society). A less restrictive means, in
73. Id.
74. Id. at 315-16.
75. Id. at 316.
76. Ninety-eight percent of Hispanics believe it is imperative that their children
learn to speak, read, and write English very well. Id.
77. Statistics show that there are long waiting lists of immigrants wishing to study
English. English As Official Language: Hearings on S. 356 Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Karen K. Narasaki, Executive
Director, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium), available in 1996 WL
7135994, at *1-*2. In 1994, about 5000 immigrants were turned away from "English As
A Second Language" classes in Washington, D.C. for lack of available student openings.
Id. New York schools resorted to a lottery system to decide enrollment in English
classes. Id. Los Angeles schools are also plagued with lists of 40,000 to 50,000 immi-
grants who wish to enroll in English study courses. Id.
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the form of increased education, will serve to reach the desired
end without resulting in invidious discrimination. As a result, in
analyzing this particular interest (i.e. encouraging non-English-
speaking minorities to learn English), English-Only legislation
fails strict scrutiny and violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
78
Moreover, in light of the three-generation model 79 and in
light of the fact that nearly 100% of Hispanics believe learning
English is essential for their children,80 the parallel argument
that bilingual education or ballots serve as disincentives to
learning English is unconvincing. The truth is that individual
immigrants learn English in conformance to their age and time
spent in the United States.8' The elimination of bilingual ballots
or education, by the implementation of Article 28, or any other
English-Only legislation, will not aid immigrants language ac-
quisition any quicker.
8 2
English-Only ballots will only serve to disenfranchise immi-
grants and will result in less governmental participation by mi-
78. It is clear that English-Only legislation will not survive strict judicial review
when the government objective used to justify the unequal discrimination is lingual
unity. It is equally clear though that such an objective may pass a lower level scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. It can be effectively contended that, as a means to an
end, English-Only laws are rationally related to the intended objective of lingual unity.
However, since there is a strong inference that non-English speakers affected by English-
Only laws make up a suspect/national-origin class based on language, it is highly un-
likely the lowest level scrutiny is the most appropriate standard to be applied in this in-
stance.
79. Califa, supra note 27, at 314-15.
80. See Perea, supra note 30, at 314.
81. The Veltman Study found that Hispanics' proficiency in learning English is de-
termined by two factors: 1) how long the immigrant has lived in the United States; and
2) how old the immigrant was when he/she arrived in the United States. Califa, supra
note 27, at 314-15. The study noted that older adolescents and adults do not learn Eng-
lish as quickly as younger immigrants. Id. Yet, the language shift does occur usually
within three generations. Id.
82. The Linguistic Society of America and the National Council for Language and
International Studies have come to the conclusion that
Article 28 will not further the state's asserted interest in promoting a com-
mon language. Immigrants are learning English in much the same way and
at the same rate as they did in the past. What determines how quickly im-
migrants learn English is the age at which they arrive in this country, the
length of time they have been here, the quality of the State's educational sys-
tem, and other factors over which Article 28 exerts no control.
Brief of Amici Curiae Linguistic Society of America and National Council for Languages
and International Studies in Support of Respondents at 7, Yniguez (No. 95-974), available
in 1996 WL 413764.
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norities.83 Similarly, English-Only education will hinder immi-
grant students' transition to their learning in English. 4 Studies
have concluded that native language instruction helps students
perform better in subjects like math and science and aids in
their transition to English instruction. 85 The absence of such
native-language education could lead to a generation of second-
class students who will have difficulty not only in learning to
speak English but also in understanding academic concepts.
Thus, in terms of voting and education, it appears that, once
again, increased education, not enforced English-Only legisla-
tion, will better serve the state's long-term objectives.
Neither disenfranchisement nor monolingual schooling by
use of English-Only laws will work to encourage English mono-
lingualism; only increased educational opportunities and time
will do that. Prohibiting bilingual ballots and bilingual educa-
tion by implementing English-Only laws is not a means narrowly
tailored to the alleged compelling objective of English-centered
monolingualism. Such a law will not encourage non-English
speakers to learn the language. Such a law will only succeed in
disenfranchising non-English speakers and hinder their educa-
tional process. This effect is discrimination based on suspect
class characteristics because it is contendable that language
skills (or rather lack of English-language skills) is a proxy for
identifying different national-origin groups. These laws are un-
constitutional, not only because the invidiously discriminatory
effect of the laws outweighs the alleged interest, but also because
education can be identified as a less restrictive means of achiev-
ing the same proffered objective. As a result, English-Only laws
fail strict judicial review under the alleged interest of encourag-
ing non-English speakers to learn English.
86
83. In fact, opponents of English-Only laws state that the ulterior purpose of such
laws is to strip minorities of their voting power. Califa, supra note 27, at 317.
84. Id. at 318.
85. Id.
86. It is important to note that a rational basis review of English-Only laws under
this objective might pass constitutional muster. However, given the fact that, once
again, language is used to identify and discriminate against a suspect class, application
of such low-level scrutiny would be improper.
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B. English-Only Laws are not Narrowly Tailored to
the State Interest of Government Efficiency
Proponents of English-Only legislation argue that the pur-
pose of the amendment is to foster unity within individual com-
munities and within the nation as a whole. However, they also
argue that the amendment will persuade non-English speakers
to learn English and will curtail the expense incurred by the
government in supplying individuals with information or docu-
ments in foreign languages.8 7 Proponents of English-Only legis-
lation note that the Internal Revenue Service is printing 500,000
tax forms in Spanish only to have fewer than 1000 returned;88
they claim that such multilingualism in government affairs is
highly inefficient. Opponents of English-Only laws counter this
claim by noting that over five years only 265 documents out of
40,000 released by the Government Printing Office are released
in foreign languages8 9 and that only .06% of federal documents
are printed in languages other than English.90 They argue that
English-Only laws will not provide the least expensive, most ef-
ficient alternative to achieve government efficiency as would
satisfy strict scrutiny.
Article 28, like most state English-Only laws, prevents gov-
ernment employees, even if they speak a second language, from
communicating in any language other than English while on the
job. This law does not promote efficiency, especially when the
citizens that government employees are aiding are non-English
speakers. The law effectively prohibits employees from using a
skill already learned that can significantly increase their pro-
ductivity and effectiveness in aiding patron citizens. Prevented
from communicating in the foreign language they already know
how to speak, government workers, muzzled under English-Only
legislation, actually increase costs and delay services that citi-
zens, even non-English-speakers, are entitled to. As a result,
foreign-language speakers are deprived temporarily, if not per-
manently, of government services and information. This leads to
87. Swope, supra note 65.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. English As Official Language; Hearings on S. 356 Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Juan F. Perea, Professor Of Law,
University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Fla.), available in 1996 WL 5510006, at
*41-*42.
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increased opportunity costs, not only to patron citizens, but also
to the government because government workers will be barred
from timely completing their jobs and thus government business
will be stifled and delayed. In view of such a result, it is doubt-
ful that English-Only laws are narrowly tailored to the interest
of government efficiency. Instead, these laws appear to be more
narrowly tailored to government inefficiency. Thus, the invidi-
ous classification of minorities based on language fluency is not
justified by an alleged interest in state efficiency. Even assum-
ing that efficiency is a compelling state interest, English-Only
laws do not promote efficiency, and therefore, the state interest
is not satisfied. Thus, the efficiency argument for English-Only
fails strict scrutiny analysis and constitutes a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
C. There is No Evidentiary Proof to Support the
Argument that English Should be Declared the
Official Language Before Spanish is Declared
Official
In light of the fact that there are and have been no move-
ments to establish Spanish or any other foreign language91 as
the official language of the nation, the contention that an Eng-
lish-Only law should be passed to assuage such a fear is sheer
paranoia and nothing short of absurd. Not one Hispanic organi-
zation believes that Spanish should be the country's official lan-
guage.9 2 On the contrary, Hispanics and other non-English-
speaking minorities living in the United States have embraced
the English language.9 3 English has become the only universal
language and is used daily for easy communication between
people speaking different languages and coming from different
cultures. 94 The thought that its eminence could be replaced is
nothing more than a scare-tactic employed by English-Only pro-
ponents.95
91. See Califa, supra note 27, at 321.
92. Id.
93. Id. This is supported by the three-generation model developed in the Veltman
Study. Id. at 314-15.




Establishing English-Only laws will not make English any
more widely spoken in the United States. Therefore, the imple-
mentation of English-Only laws is not a narrowly tailored means
of reaching the alleged compelling interest of having English as
the official language; no compelling state interest will be served,
and strict judicial review is not satisfied. Again, educating more
non-English speakers through increased English study programs
would better serve the state objective of increasing English use
and would undoubtedly be a less restrictive means of achieving
that goal.96
D. There is no Evidence that, Absent a Declaration
of English as the Official Language of the
Nation, the United States will Suffer Linguistic
Discord and Separatism as has Plagued Other
Bilingual Countries
Advocates of the English-Only movement contend that, ab-
sent a declaration of English as the official language, the nation
will degenerate into a bilingual separatism of the likes of coun-
tries such as Canada, Sri Lanka, and Belgium.97 They believe
that bilingualism will lead to civil strife and disunity of the na-
tion.98 The truth is that the problems plaguing Canada and the
other countries mentioned are very different from the problems
affecting the United States.99 Canada, Sri Lanka, and Belgium
are distinguishable from the United States in that these coun-
tries have developed with specific geographic regions where dif-
ferent languages have been spoken; 00 the same cannot be said of
the United States-a country founded on a "melting pot" theory
where immigrants and their different cultures and languages
were traditionally welcomed and, for the most part, spread out
throughout the country. Since its beginnings, the United States
has not been divided into regions where specific languages other
96. As in the last two proffered objectives, English-Only laws are not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the compelling state interest of preventing a foreign language from being
declared the official language of the country; instead English-Only laws result in invidi-
ous classifications. Nevertheless, English-Only laws may be rationally related to the
state objective of declaring English the official language; thus, under a rational-basis
standard, English-Only legislation may be constitutional.
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than English were spoken. Thus, it seems farfetched to suggest
that these countries are a prophetic example of what awaits the
United States in the future.
However, even if one assumes the parallel drawn between
Canada, Sri Lanka, Belgium, and the United States, it is doubt-
ful that English-Only laws could be a viable antidote to any fu-
ture linguistic disparity within the United States. Instead, Can-
ada, Belgium, and Sri Lanka are prime examples of how
"divisiveness and discord is more likely when one language is
declared official to the disadvantage of speakers of another lan-
guage."101 Arguably, establishing English-Only laws and thereby
sanctioning discrimination against an entire language group in
the name of national unity will only serve to label immigrants as
being inferior and un-American, and will only be to the disad-
vantage of them; it is this type of high sentiment, prejudice, and
statements that have lead to the civil discontent of countries like
Canada, Belgium, and Sri Lanka. The fact that we live in a soci-
ety with many forms of expressing ourselves is not a sign of bi-
lingual separatism, and it never will be; it is a form of lingual
and cultural pluralism. To do away with lingual and cultural
pluralism via language restrictions in the name of national unity
will beget social discontent among non-English speakers, and it
is those precise movements to quash one language for the benefit
of another that have caused all the problems in Canada, Bel-
gium, and Sri Lanka. 0
2
This line of reasoning has led many opponents of English-
Only laws to conclude that English-Only laws such as Article 28
are fueled by cultural insecurity and prejudice against Hispanics
and other non-English-speaking minorities and not by any com-
101. Id. In 1969, Canada declared English and French its official languages. Brief
for Respondent Maria-Kelly Yniguez at 42, Yniguez (No. 95-974), available in 1996 WL
426410. Five years later, a French-speaking provincial majority declared French the ex-
clusive language of Quebec; they considered the English-speaking minority to be a
threat. Id. The establishment of French as the official language resulted in more re-
strictive language laws and increased divisiveness among language groups. Id. As a re-
sult, "Canada's experience with official language movements suggests that divisiveness
and discord are more likely when a single language is declared official." Id. The same
can be said for the countries of Belgium and Sri Lanka. In 1956, the Seshalese-speaking
majority of Sri Lanka decided to make their language official; this instigated a bloody
resistance from the Tamil minority. Califa, supra note 27, at 323. Similarly, in Belgium,
the violence of divisiveness resulted from the French-speakers' intolerance of their
Dutch-speaking compatriots. Id.
102. Califa, supra note 27, at 323.
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pelling state interest;03 they propose that Article 28 was written
with an ulterior motive and discriminatory intent against non-
English-speaking minorities and is an example of xenophobia,
not an attempt at pluralistic unity.1°4 Therefore, once again, it
seems to be highly questionable whether there is a close fit be-
tween English-Only laws and the proffered compelling state in-
terest. Instead, it seems more likely that the invidious and dis-
criminatory effect of English-Only laws is greater than the
intended effect of the proposed objective. State action is not nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling government interest and, again,
English-language education offers a less restrictive means by
which the same purpose can be achieved. 0 5
103. For example, consider the comments made by Antonio Califa:
The English-Only movement is fueled by cultural insecurity and prejudice
against Hispanics. The leaders of this movement are clearly worried about
something else. They are frightened by Hispanic immigration and the pos-
sibility that Anglos will lose political dominance. The anti-Hispanic feelings,
however, are not motivated entirely by self-interest. Pure prejudice also
plays a part. English-Only proponents feel that Hispanics have objectionable
cultural traits which are harmful to the country. Cultural insecurity may
also underlie the fear that the economy cannot accommodate the large num-
ber of Hispanic immigrants who are attracted to the United States.
Id. at 347.
104. In the continuation of such an argument, opponents of English-Only often cite
to an internal memorandum written by former head of "English-Only," John Tanton:
Gobernar es poblar translates "to govern is to populate." In this society
where the majority rules, does this hold? Will the present majority peaceably
hand over its political power to a group that is simply more fertile? ... Can
homo cantraceptivus compete with homo progenitiva [sic] if borders aren't
controlled? Or is advice to limit one's family simply advice to move over and
let someone else with greater reproductive powers occupy the space? ... Per-
haps this is the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to
get caught by those with their pants down! ...
How will we make the transition from a dominant non-Hispanic society
with a Spanish influence to a dominant Spanish society with a non-Hispanic
influence? ... As Whites see their power and control over their lives declining,
will they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion?
We're building in a deadly disunity.
JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF "ENGLISH
ONLY" 151 (1992).
105. Unlike the last three proffered objectives, this objective would probably not pass
the low-level scrutiny offered under rational-basis review. It is highly doubtful that
English-Only laws are rationally related to the objective of preventing civil upheaval in
the United States. There is no rational relation between such laws and the prevention of
civil disparateness. On the contrary, English-Only laws seem to be more rationally re-
lated to the instigation of civil disparateness. Under such an analysis, the constitutional-
ity of English-Only laws, even under a low-level, rational-basis review, is dubious.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because English-Only laws have failed to supply a close fit
between the stated objectives and the legislation written into the
amendment, and because education is a less restrictive classifi-
cation that would achieve the same purpose, Article 28 should
not survive strict judicial scrutiny and should be found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. No compelling government interest
is served by allowing language to discriminatorily act as a surro-
gate for national origin. Article 28 and other English-Only laws
fail to meet the objectives they purport to achieve. English-Only
laws do not foster national unity, and they do not encourage
immigrants to learn English any sooner. Instead, they only
serve to disenfranchise immigrant voters, hinder the public edu-
cation of immigrant children, and work to divide-not unite-
immigrant and Anglo communities.
In studying English-Only laws under a Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis, it is clear that education is a less restrictive
means of fulfilling the same objective-a means that does not
wrongly use language as a proxy for unwanted national origins.
Through education and increased English-Only study programs,
immigrants and nonimmigrants work together in a fashion that
embraces pluralistic languages and cultures with the goal of in-
creasing English's eminence in the country without relying on
xenophobic fears and prejudices. Under such a method, objective
results are met and the Equal Protection Clause is not violated
through language discrimination that unfairly connotes national
origin.
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